




























































ecause of its mystifying characteristics, cyberspace has been called a 
“fifth dimension” or a “fifth domain.” There seems to be a widespread be-
lief that it eludes the traditional rules and principles of international law, 
and that there is an urgent need for new rules specifically designed for cy-
berspace. All too often in the past we witnessed a considerable degree of 
perplexity vis-à-vis new technologies that resulted in similar desperate calls 
for new norms; however, only in rare cases were such calls justified. If ana-
lyzed soberly, international law as it currently exists need not capitulate to 
the novelty of the technology on which cyberspace is based or to the 
threats that did not exist prior to the cyber age. Interestingly, States seem to 
agree that customary international law is, in principle, applicable to cyber-
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space, although there may be a need for a consensual adaptation to the 
specific characteristics of cyberspace. 
This article will explore whether—and to what extent—the principle of 
territorial sovereignty and the law of neutrality apply to cyberspace. It will 
be shown that certain components of—and certain activities in—
cyberspace are governed by the principle of territorial sovereignty and that 
neither general international law nor the law of neutrality has become obso-
lete merely because cyberspace may be considered a fifth dimension or part 
of the global commons. 
 
II. TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY 
 
A. General Characteristics of Territorial Sovereignty 
 
Under the principle of territorial sovereignty a State exercises full and ex-
clusive authority over its territory.1 As stated by Judge Max Huber in the 
Palmas Island arbitration award, “Sovereignty in the relations between States 
signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is 
the right to exercise therein, to the exclusivity of any other States, the func-
tions of a State.”2 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has emphasized 
that “[b]etween independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an 
essential foundation of international relations.”3 Territorial sovereignty, 
therefore, implies that, subject to applicable customary or conventional 
rules of international law, the State alone is entitled to exercise jurisdiction, 
especially by subjecting objects and persons within its territory to domestic 
legislation and to enforce these rules. Moreover, the State is entitled to con-
trol access to and egress from its territory. The latter right seems to also 
apply to all forms of communication. Finally, territorial sovereignty pro-
tects a State against any form of interference by other States. While such 
interference may amount to a use of force, this article does not address that 
issue. 
It must be remembered that territorial sovereignty is relative in charac-
ter insofar as it does not merely afford protection to States, but also impos-
es obligations on States, especially the “obligation to protect within the ter-
                                                                                                                      
1. See, e.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18–20 (Sept. 7) 
[hereinafter Lotus]; Free Zones of Upper Savoy and Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A/B) No. 46, at 166–68 (June 7). 
2. Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).  













ritory the rights of other States, in particular their right to integrity and in-
violability in peace and in war, together with the rights which each State 
may claim for its nationals in foreign territory.”4 
 
B. Territorial Sovereignty and Cyberspace 
 
“Cyberspace” has been defined as a “global domain within the information 
environment consisting of the interdependent network of information 
technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications 
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.”5 
There is a widely held view that it “is not a physical place—it defies meas-
urement in any physical dimension or time space continuum. It is a short-
hand term that refers to the environment created by the confluence of co-
operative networks of computers, information systems, and telecommuni-
cation infrastructures commonly referred to as the World Wide Web.”6 It is 
true that cyberspace is characterized by anonymity and ubiquity.7 It seems 
logical, therefore, to assimilate it to the high seas, international airspace or 
outer space,8 that is, to consider it a “global common” or, legally, a res com-
munis omnium.9 However, these characterizations merely lead to the obvious 
                                                                                                                      
4. Island of Palmas, supra note 2, at 839. In his separate opinion in the Corfu Channel 
case, Judge Alvarez stated, “By sovereignty, we understand the whole body of rights and 
attributes which a State possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all other States, and 
also in its relations with other States. Sovereignty confers rights upon States and imposes 
obligations upon them.” Corfu Channel, supra note 3, at 43. 
5. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and As-
sociated Terms (Nov. 8, 2010), as amended through July 15, 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/ 
doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf [hereinafter Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms]. 
See also the definition by Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use under 
International Law, 64 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 121, 126 (2009) (a “domain characterized by 
the use of [computers and other electronic devices] to store, modify, and exchange data 
via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures”). 
6. THOMAS C. WINGFIELD, THE LAW OF INFORMATION CONFLICT: NATIONAL SE-
CURITY LAW IN CYBERSPACE 17 (2000). 
7. It has been rightly stated that “global digital networks have the features they do—
of placelessness, anonymity, and ubiquity—because of politics, not in spite of them.” See 
Geoffrey L. Herrera, Cyberspace and Sovereignty: Thoughts on Physical Space and Digital 
Space 12 (2006) (paper prepared for the 47th Annual International Studies Association 
Convention March 22–25, 2006), http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p98069_index.html. 
8. For an analysis to that effect, see Patrick W. Franzese, Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Can It 
Exist?, 64 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 1, 17–42 (2009). 
9. U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in 












conclusion that cyberspace in its entirety is not subject to the sovereignty 
of a single State or group of States—that it is immune from appropriation. 
Despite the correct classification of “cyberspace as such” as a res com-
munis omnium, State practice provides sufficient evidence that components 
of cyberspace are not immune from territorial sovereignty nor from the 
exercise of State jurisdiction. States have exercised, and will continue to 
exercise, their criminal jurisdiction over cyber crimes10 and they continue to 
regulate activities in cyberspace. Moreover, the simple truth that “cyber-
space requires a physical architecture to exist”11 may not be disregarded. 
The equipment constituting the architecture is usually located within the 
territory of a State. It is owned by the government or by corporations; it is 
connected to the national electric grid.12 The integration of physical com-
ponents of cyber infrastructure located within a State’s territory into the 
“global domain” of cyberspace cannot be interpreted as a waiver of the 
exercise of territorial sovereignty. While, in view of the genuine architecture 
of cyberspace, it may be difficult to exercise sovereignty, the technological 
and technical problems involved do not prevent a State from exercising its 
jurisdiction over the cyber infrastructure located in areas in its sovereign 
territory. States have, in fact, continuously emphasized their right to exer-
cise control over such infrastructure, to assert their jurisdiction over cyber 
activities on their territory and to protect their cyber infrastructure against 
transborder interference by other States or by individuals.13 
                                                                                                                      
inafter DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace] (“DoD will treat cyberspace as an op-
erational domain to organize, train, and equip so that DoD can take full advantage of cy-
berspace’s potential.”). See also U.S. Department of Defense, The Strategy for Homeland 
Defense and Civil Support 12 (2005), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/ 
Jun2005/d20050630homeland.pdf (“The global commons consist of international waters 
and airspace, space, and cyberspace.”). 
10. See, e.g., Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, Europ. T.S. No. 185. 
11. Franzese, supra note 8, at 33. 
12. See Joshua E. Kastenberg, Non-Intervention and Neutrality in Cyberspace: An Emerging 
Principle in the National Practice of International Law, 64 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 43, 64 
(2009). 
13. See DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, supra note 9. See also U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense, Cyberspace Policy Report: A Report to Congress Pursuant to the Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Section 934, at 7–8 (2011), available 
at http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0411_cyberstrategy/docs/NDAA%20 
Section%20934%20Report_For%20webpage.pdf [hereinafter Cyberspace Policy Report]; 
THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY, SECU-













It needs to be emphasized that the applicability of the principle of sov-
ereignty to the components of, and activities in, cyberspace is not barred by 
the innovative and novel character of the underlying technology. This 
holds true for the majority of rules and principles of customary interna-
tional law. In the 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace, the Obama 
administration rightly stated that the “development of norms for state con-
duct in cyberspace does not require a reinvention of customary interna-
tional law, nor does it render existing international norms obsolete. Long-
standing international norms guiding state behavior—in times of peace and 
conflict—also apply in cyberspace.”14 
This does not necessarily mean that the rules and principles of interna-
tional law are applicable to cyberspace in their traditional interpretation. 
Because of the novel character of cyberspace, and in view of the vulnerabil-
ity of cyber infrastructure, there is a noticeable uncertainty among govern-
ments and legal scholars as to whether the traditional rules and principles 
are sufficient to provide answers to some worrisome questions. It is, there-
fore, of utmost importance that States agree not only on the application of 
customary international law to cyberspace, but also on a common interpre-
tation of that law that takes into due consideration the “unique attributes of 
networked technology.”15 As called for in the International Strategy for 
Cyberspace, it is necessary that governments “continue to work interna-




                                                                                                                      
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf 
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE]. 
14. INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE, supra note 13, at 9. 
15. “Nonetheless, unique attributes of networked technology require additional work 
to clarify how these norms apply and what additional understandings might be necessary 
to supplement them.” Id. 
16. Id. See also Cyberspace Policy Report, supra note 13, at 7 (“The United States is ac-
tively engaged in the continuing development of norms of responsible state behavior in 
cyberspace, making clear that as a matter of U.S. policy, long-standing international norms 
guiding state behavior also apply equally in cyberspace. Among these, applying the tenets 
of the law of armed conflict are critical to this vision, although cyberspace’s unique aspects 
may require clarifications in certain areas.”). The report emphasizes that the “law of armed 
conflict and customary international law . . . provide a strong basis to apply such norms to 












C. Scope of Territorial Sovereignty in Cyberspace 
 
The general applicability of the principle of territorial sovereignty to cyber-
space encompasses that cyber infrastructure located on a State’s land area, 
in its internal waters, territorial sea and, where applicable, archipelagic wa-
ters, and in national airspace.17 Thus, in principle, the State is entitled to 
exercise control over cyber infrastructure and cyber activities in those areas. 
It must be kept in mind, however, that the exercise of sovereignty may be 
restricted by customary or conventional rules of international law, such as 
the immunity of diplomatic correspondence18 and the rights of innocent 
passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage.19 
 
1. Geographic Scope (Ratione Loci) 
 
After this identification of the areas in which the principle of territorial 
sovereignty applies, the first consequence is that cyber infrastructure locat-
ed in those areas is protected against interference by other States. This pro-
tection is not limited to interference amounting to an unjustified use of 
force, to an armed attack or to a prohibited intervention.20 Rather, because 
the interference constitutes an exercise of that State’s jurisdiction, any ac-
tivity attributable to it is considered a violation of the sovereignty of the 
territorial State.21 This, a fortiori, holds true if the conduct has negative im-
pacts on the integrity or function of another State’s cyber infrastructure. 
However, not all State conduct that impacts on the cyber infrastructure of 
another State necessarily constitutes a violation of the principle of territori-
al sovereignty. If the act of interference results in inflicting material damage 
                                                                                                                      
17. Note that within the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf coastal 
States do not enjoy territorial sovereignty, but merely certain “sovereign rights” with re-
spect to the natural resources in those sea areas. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea 
arts. 56, 77, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter LOS Convention]. 
18. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 27(1), Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. Computers and computer networks located in the diplomatic mis-
sion are protected by Article 22. 
19. LOS Convention, supra note 17, arts. 17–26, 37–42, 45, 52–53. 
20. It is important to note that the prohibitions on the use of force and intervention 
only apply to States, i.e., to conduct attributable to a State. However, Article 51 of the UN 
Charter does not refer to the source of an armed attack giving rise to the “inherent right 
of self-defense.” Today there is general agreement that the right applies to armed attacks 
by both State and non-State actors. 
21. See, e.g., 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 123 (Robert Jennings & Arthur 













to the cyber infrastructure, there seems to be a general consensus that such 
an act constitutes a violation of the sovereignty of the target State.22 Ac-
cording to some, the damage inflicted must be not just material but se-
vere.23 If, however, there is no material damage or merely minor damage, it 
is unsettled whether that activity can be considered a violation of territorial 
sovereignty.24 Those who hold that material damage is required usually cite 
espionage, including cyber espionage, as an example of an activity that is 
not a violation, because international law does not prohibit espionage. The 
fact that the data resident in the target system are modified by the act of 
intrusion is not considered sufficient to characterize cyber espionage as a 
prohibited violation of territorial sovereignty. It could be argued, however, 
that damage is irrelevant and the mere fact that a State has intruded into 
the cyber infrastructure of another State should be considered an exercise 
of jurisdiction on foreign territory, which always constitutes a violation of 
the principle of territorial sovereignty. 
The International Strategy for Cyberspace indicates the following activ-
ities may qualify as violations of territorial sovereignty: attacks on networks; 
exploitation of networks; and other hostile acts in cyberspace that threaten 
peace and stability, civil liberties and privacy.25 While the specific natures of 
those activities are not indicated, it seems that the U.S. government is ad-
vocating a rather wide scope of the principle of territorial sovereignty in 
asserting the right to counter such acts with all necessary means, including, 
if necessary, the use of conventional force. 
It is irrelevant whether the cyber infrastructure protected by the princi-
ple of territorial sovereignty belongs to or is operated by governmental in-
stitutions, private entities or private individuals. Moreover, such infrastruc-
ture is also protected if it is located on board aircraft, vessels or other plat-
forms enjoying sovereign immunity.26 The provisions of the Outer Space 
                                                                                                                      
22 Id., ¶ 119. 
23. This is in recognition of the fact that the use by a State of its territory very often 
causes negative effects on the territory of neighboring States. Since the principle of territo-
rial integrity is not considered to be absolute in character there are good reasons to main-
tain that damage below the threshold of severity must be tolerated and when such damage 
occurs it does not violate the territorial sovereignty or integrity of the affected State. 
24. Those who consider damage as relevant will not classify those activities as viola-
tions of territorial sovereignty. 
25. INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE, supra note 13, at 12–14. 
26. See, e.g., LOS Convention, supra note 17, art. 95 (“warships on the high seas have 
complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State”). Under 












Treaty27 and the Liability Convention28 appear to support the conclusion 
that space objects operated exclusively for non-commercial government 
purposes also enjoy sovereign immunity.29 While there is no treaty rule ex-
plicitly according sovereign immunity to all objects used for non-
commercial government purposes, Article 5 of the UN Convention on 
State Immunity30 importantly provides that a State enjoys immunity from 
the jurisdiction of the courts of another State with regard to its property.31 
This provision, along with the other treaties and rules just cited, provides 
sufficient evidence of a general principle of public international law accord-
ing to which objects owned by a State or used by that State for exclusively 
non-commercial government purposes are an integral part of the State’s 
sovereignty and are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State if lo-
cated outside the territory of another State.  
“Sovereign immunity” means that any interference with an object en-
joying such immunity constitutes a violation of the sovereignty of that 
State.32 It must be borne in mind, however, that in times of international 
armed conflict the principle of sovereign immunity plays no role in rela-
tions between the belligerent States. During such conflicts objects enjoying 
                                                                                                                      
ernment non-commercial service” have the same immunity. With regard to State aircraft 
in international airspace, there is general consensus that they also enjoy sovereign immuni-
ty. See PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, COMMENTARY 
ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE 
WARFARE rule 1(cc), cmt. to rule 1(cc), ¶ 6 (2010), available at http://ihlresearch.org/amw/ 
Commentary%20on%20the%20HPCR%20Manual.pdf%20[hereinafter HPCR MANUAL].  
27. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 
U.N.T.S. 205. 
28. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187. 
29. Space objects, such as satellites used for governmental and commercial purposes 
either by the State of registry or by that State in cooperation with a private corporation, do 
not enjoy sovereign immunity. 
30. U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, G.A. 
Res. 59/38, annex, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/59/49 (Dec. 16, 
2004). 
31. For an assessment, see David P. Stewart, Current Developments: The UN Convention 
on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 99 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 194, 195–207. (2005). 
32. For a first finding with regard to the sovereign immunity of warships, see the 
award of the Anglo-American Claims Commission in the Jessie case. Owners of the Jessie, 
the Thomas F. Bayard and the Pescawha (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 6 R.I.A.A. 57 (1921), Reports: 













sovereign immunity may be destroyed if they qualify as lawful targets or are 
subject to seizure as booty of war33 by the enemy’s armed forces. Moreo-
ver, sovereign immunity is not limitless. For instance, the U.S. drone cap-
tured by Iran in December 2011 (allegedly downed by cyber means) had 
probably been in Iran’s national airspace, thus violating Iran’s territorial 
sovereignty.34 Hence, Iran was entitled to use all necessary means, including 
cyber means, to terminate that violation. 
Vessels and aircraft that do not exclusively serve non-commercial gov-
ernmental purposes do not enjoy sovereign immunity. This doesn’t mean, 
however, they are not protected when located in areas or spaces not cov-
ered by the territorial sovereignty of any State. While they cannot be con-
sidered an integral component of a State’s sovereignty, they are included 
within the protective scope of that sovereignty by the link of nationality. 
Hence, the State of nationality exercises exclusive jurisdiction over such 
vessels and aircraft when they are located on the high seas or in interna-
tional airspace. Accordingly, any interference with them constitutes a viola-
tion of the sovereignty of the State of nationality unless justified by a rule 
of international law. This also applies to space objects. It is prohibited un-
der the Outer Space Treaty35 to interfere with the activities of other States 
in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. It is immaterial whether 
the space object is owned or operated by the government or by a private 
corporation. On the high seas and in international airspace the cyber infra-
structure will regularly be located on board a vessel or aircraft. The deter-
mination of the State whose sovereignty and jurisdiction apply will depend 
on either following the flag-State principle36 or on the registration of the 
aircraft.37 Nationality of space objects is also determined by registration.38 
                                                                                                                      
33. See Yoram Dinstein, Booty in Warfare, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012), http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber 
_article?script=yes&id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-e256&recno=4&author=Dins 
tein%20%20Yoram [hereinafter MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA]. 
34. For competing views of the circumstances of the capture, see, e.g., David Axe, 
Nah, Iran Probably Didn’t Hack CIA’s Stealth Drone, WIRED (Apr. 24, 2012, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/04/iran-drone-hack/; Mathew J. Schwartz, 
Iran Hacked GPS Signals to Capture U.S. Drone, INFORMATION WEEK (Dec. 16, 2011, 12:30 
PM), http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/iran-hacked-gps-signals-to-cap 
ture-us-dr/232300666. 
35. Supra note 27. 
36 LOS Convention, supra note 19, art. 92. 
37. See Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 17, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 












2. Exercise of Jurisdiction (Scope Ratione Materiae) 
 
The second consequence of the applicability of the principle of territorial 
sovereignty to the components of cyberspace is the wide-ranging right of 
the territorial State (including the flag State and the State of registry) to ex-
ercise its jurisdiction over cyber infrastructure and over cyber activities. 
The concept of jurisdiction may be understood in a broad sense as re-
ferring to a State’s “lawful power to act and hence to its power to decide 
whether and, if so, how to act, whether by legislative, executive or judicial 
means. In this sense, jurisdiction denominates primarily, but not exclusive-
ly, the lawful power to make and enforce rules.”39 As has already been not-
ed, the exercise of jurisdiction is not limited to a State’s territory. For in-
stance, a State exercises exclusive jurisdiction on board vessels flying its 
flag and on board aircraft registered in that State. Moreover, according to 
the principles of active and passive nationality, a State is entitled to exercise 
its jurisdiction over the conduct of individuals that occurred outside its ter-
ritory. Under the universality principle, the same holds true even if neither 
the perpetrator nor the victim is a national of the State in question. Finally, 
the exercise of jurisdiction can be based upon the protective principle.40 
For the purposes of this article, the jurisdictional bases just listed, alt-
hough of importance in the cyber domain, need not be addressed; the fo-
cus will be on the scope of territorial jurisdiction.  
It may be noted in this context that territorial jurisdiction does not nec-
essarily presuppose territorial sovereignty. For instance, a State may exer-
cise exclusive jurisdiction over territory leased or occupied.41 Jurisdiction 
conferred on coastal States in their exclusive economic zones or on their 
continental shelves, although it may be conceived of as quasi-territorial in 
character, is only analogous to territorial jurisdiction strictu sensu, because it 
is limited to certain prescribed activities. 
The State’s right to exercise its jurisdiction, that is, to proscribe, enforce 
and adjudicate activities of objects and persons physically or legally present 
in its territory, seems to be undisputed unless otherwise limited by applica-
                                                                                                                      
38. See Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 
1973, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15. 
39. Bernard H. Oxman, Jurisdiction of States ¶ 1, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra 
note 23, http://www.mpepil.com/subscriber_article?script=yes&id=/epil/entries/law-
9780199231690-e1436&recno=1&author=Oxman  Bernard H. 
40. For a discussion of the different bases of jurisdiction, see id., ¶¶ 11–45. 













ble rules of international law, probably including human rights law. Cyber 
infrastructure located within the territory of a State, and cyber activities 
occurring therein, are susceptible to almost unlimited proscriptive and en-
forcement measures by the State. Territorial jurisdiction includes the right 
of a State to regulate, restrict or prohibit access to its cyber infrastructure, 
whether access is gained from within or without its territory. It must be re-
emphasized that integration of the physical components of cyber infra-
structure located within a State’s territory into the “global domain” of cy-
berspace does not constitute a waiver of the exercise of territorial sover-
eignty and jurisdiction. In view of the mobility of users and of cloud- or 
grid-distributed systems, it may often be very difficult to effectively exercise 
territorial jurisdiction. Still, those difficulties do not justify the conclusion 
that territorial jurisdiction, if applied to cyberspace, is but a “toothless 
tiger.” To the contrary, States have regularly and quite successfully—while 
not always applauded—proven their willingness and determination to en-
force their domestic law over a variety of cyber activities. 
A specific feature of territorial jurisdiction is the so-called effects doc-
trine, under which a State is entitled to exercise its jurisdiction over a con-
duct occurring outside its territory that produces effects in its territory.42 A 
useful explanation of that doctrine has been provided in a European Court 
of Justice judgment: 
 
The two undisputed bases on which State jurisdiction is founded under 
international law are territoriality and nationality. The former confers ju-
risdiction on the State in which the person or the goods in question are 
situated or the event in question took place. The latter confers jurisdic-
tion over nationals of the State concerned.  
 
Territoriality itself has given rise to two distinct principles of jurisdiction: 
 
(i)  subjective territoriality, which permits a State to deal with acts 
which originated within its territory, even though they were 
completed abroad; 
 
(ii)  objective territoriality, which, conversely, permits a State to deal 
with acts which originated abroad but which were completed, at 
least in part, within its own territory. . . . 
 
                                                                                                                      












[The effects doctrine] confers jurisdiction upon a State even if the con-
duct which produced [the effects] did not take place within its territory.43 
 
Applied to the cyber domain, the effects doctrine may give rise to the exer-
cise of jurisdiction over individuals who have conducted cyber operations 
against the cyber infrastructure in another State.44 
In summary, the principle of territorial sovereignty, and the ensuing 
right of a State to exercise its territorial jurisdiction, applies to cyberspace 
insofar as the cyber infrastructure is located within its territory or on plat-
forms over which the State exercises exclusive jurisdiction. Territorial sov-
ereignty and territorial jurisdiction also apply to individuals present in the 
State and to conduct that either takes place within that territory or produc-
es harmful effects therein. The exercise of jurisdiction under any of the 
recognized bases of international law is limited only if there exist explicit 
rules to that effect. Thus, the characteristics of cyberspace do not pose an 
obstacle to the exercise of territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction; they 
merely increase the difficulty of so doing. 
 
D. Obligations of States in Cyberspace and the Issue of Attributability 
 
1. Obligations of States in Cyberspace45 
 
As noted previously, the principle of territorial sovereignty not only pro-
tects States by affording them exclusive rights, but also imposes obligations 
on them.46 The protective scope of those obligations serves to protect the 





                                                                                                                      
43. Joined Cases C-89, 104, 114, 116–117, 125–129/85, A. Ahlström Osakeyhtio v. 
Comm'n, 1988 E.C.R. 5193, ¶¶ 19–21 (citation omitted), available at http://eur-lex 
.europa.eu/staging/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61985CC0089:EN:HTML. 
44. Hence, irrespective of the issue of attribution, Estonia would be entitled to exer-
cise its criminal and civil jurisdiction over those individuals who conducted the distributed 
denial-of-service attacks against the Estonian cyber infrastructure in 2007. 
45. This section does not deal with the entire spectrum of obligations States are to 
observe in cyberspace; therefore, the prohibition of the use of force and the issue of 
“armed attack” are not addressed.   













a. Duty of Prevention  
 
The principle of territorial sovereignty entails an obligation imposed on all 
States to respect the territorial sovereignty of other States. As the ICJ held 
in its Nicaragua decision, “‘Between independent States, respect for territo-
rial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations,’ and 
international law requires political integrity also to be respected.”47 
The obligation to respect the territorial sovereignty of other States ap-
plies to conduct that is attributable to a State. Additionally, in the Corfu 
Channel judgment, the ICJ held that respect for the territorial sovereignty of 
other States implies the obligation of every State “not to allow knowingly 
its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”48 Ac-
cordingly, a State is required under international law to take appropriate 
actions to protect the interests of other States.49 This obligation is not lim-
ited to prevention of “criminal acts,”50 but applies to all activities inflicting 
severe damage—or that have the potential to inflict such damage—on per-
sons and objects protected by the territorial sovereignty of the target 
State.51 
In the context of cyber attacks, the duty of prevention has been cor-
rectly summarized as follows: “States have an affirmative duty to prevent 
cyberattacks from their territory against other states. This duty actually en-
compasses several smaller duties, to include . . . prosecuting attackers, and, 
during the investigation and prosecution, cooperating with the victim-states 
                                                                                                                      
47. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986 
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48. Corfu Channel, supra note 3, at 22. 
49. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 
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ner as to cause injury . . . in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons 
therein, when the case is of serious consequence . . . . 
 













of cyberattacks that originated from within their borders.”52 The term 
“cyber attack” is often understood as comprising “remote intrusions into 
computer systems by individuals”;53 however, mere intrusions are not in-
cluded, because they do not inflict direct material harm. Rather, mere intru-
sions must be considered acts of espionage.54 Since all States engage in es-
pionage, including via cyberspace, mere intrusions into foreign computers 
or networks are not covered by the prohibition on cyber attacks. 
The duty of prevention presupposes knowledge. This does not neces-
sarily mean actual knowledge; it also applies to cases of presumptive 
knowledge. A State will have actual knowledge if its organs have detected a 
cyber attack originating from its territory or if it has been informed by the 
victim-State that a cyber attack has originated from its territory. Knowledge 
is to be presumed if the cyber attack can reasonably be considered to be-
long to a series of cyber attacks. It is important to note the ICJ has held 
that even if “an act contrary to international law has occurred [on a State’s 
territory], . . . it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control ex-
ercised . . . over its territory . . . that that State necessarily knew, or ought to 
have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein.”55  
Although it may be concluded that the duty of prevention does not ap-
ply if the State from whose territory the acts have been initiated has neither 
actual nor presumptive knowledge, this conclusion is not accepted by eve-
ryone. According to some authorities, the duty of prevention should be 
based on a State’s “actions to prevent cyberattacks in general.”56 According 
to this position,  
 
States that do not enact [stringent criminal laws and undertake vigorous 
law enforcement] fail to live up to their duty to prevent cyberattacks. . . . 
A state’s passiveness and indifference toward cyberattacks make it a sanc-
tuary state from where attackers can safely operate. When viewed in this 
light, a state can be held indirectly responsible for cyberattacks . . . .57  
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54. See, e.g., Schaap, supra note 5, at 139–40. See also supra notes 20–24 and accompany-
ing text. 
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However, in this author’s opinion, the theoretical possibility that a State 
that has not enacted criminal laws—when it has not been obliged to do so 
under an international treaty—may become a sanctuary for cyber attackers 
is certainly not sufficient to justify the inapplicability of the duty of preven-
tion’s requirement for actual or presumptive knowledge. 
There are, though, circumstances that may be considered as sufficient 
to support the assumption that a State had—or ought to have had—
knowledge of the conduct. Such circumstances may exist if a cyber attack 
has been launched from cyber infrastructure that is under exclusive gov-
ernment control and that is used only for non-commercial government 
purposes. Provided that the origin of the cyber attack can be traced back to 
the government’s cyber infrastructure, there may be at least a rebuttable 
presumption that the State should have known of that use of its territory. It 
is important to note that a rebuttable presumption of knowledge does not 
mean that the conduct is attributable to the State. If it were, it would mean 
that the aggrieved State would be entitled to resort to countermeasures, 
including, when applicable, the use of force in response to an armed attack. 
The rebuttable presumption is not sufficient, however, either to attribute 
the conduct to the State or to serve as a legal basis for countermeasures, 
although that might be the case if the events were occurring in the physical 
world. Because of the difficulty of identifying the originator of a cyber at-
tack, attributing it to the State whose cyber infrastructure was utilized could 
lead to escalation since the infrastructure may have been usurped by anoth-
er State or by non-State actors, such as terrorists or other criminals. Addi-
tionally, allowing countermeasures on the basis of a “knows-or-should-
have-known standard” would impose far-reaching prevention obligations 
on States that, given the nature of the technology involved, would be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to fulfill. 
In that regard, some might be inclined to recognize the duty of preven-
tion as applying not just to cyber attacks launched from the territory of a 
State, but also to cyber attacks/cyber operations that are routed through 
the cyber infrastructure of another State. It is unsettled, however, whether 
the transit of data brings into operation the obligation of prevention even if 
the transit State knows, or should have known, of the use of its cyber infra-
structure. While extending the prevention obligation to transit of data 
seems simple, those so advocating fail to recognize the complexity of cy-
berspace. For example, the transiting data may be harmless in and of them-
selves, but they may be part of a larger packet. While the larger packet, the 












considered a “cyber weapon,” the transit State does not know this. Addi-
tionally, in most cases it would be meaningless to oblige the transit State to 
take preventive action, because the data may be rerouted, thus nevertheless 
arriving at their destination in the target State. 
 
b. Further Obligations  
 
Finally, State practice seems to justify the conclusion that there is a growing 
readiness of States to accept obligations that are of a more general charac-
ter than the obligation to refrain from harmful conduct or to prevent such 
conduct. 
For instance, the United States has taken the position that identifying 
the rules and principles of international law applicable to cyberspace must 
be guided by applying the “broad expectations of peaceful and just inter-
state conduct to cyberspace.”58 The U.S. cyberspace strategy emphasizes 
that States “need to recognize the international implications of their tech-
nical decisions, and act with respect for one another’s networks and the 
broader Internet”59 and demands that the emerging norms of cyberspace 
behavior be guided by five criteria, including global interoperability, net-
work stability and cybersecurity due diligence.60 Indeed, global interopera-
bility, which is one of the main characteristics of the Internet, can only be 
preserved if “States . . . act within their authorities to help ensure the end-
to-end interoperability of an Internet accessible to all.”61 Network stability 
presupposes that States do not “arbitrarily interfere with internationally 
interconnected infrastructure.”62 Since cybersecurity due diligence is under-
stood to imply that “States should recognize and act on their responsibility 
to protect information infrastructures and secure national systems from 
damage or misuse,”63 it may be considered as reflecting the obligation of 
prevention as it currently exists under customary international law. It is this 
author’s belief that each of the criteria enumerated in the International 
Strategy for Cyberspace may not yet have attained that status, but they may 
well be accepted by a considerable number of States—at least by those that 
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are “like-minded.” The criteria may, in any event, be considered to be of 
potentially norm-creating character, thus contributing to the progressive 




Effective protection of territorial sovereignty in the cyber domain presup-
poses that particular conduct can be attributed to another State. The rather 
strict attributability criteria in Articles 4 to 11 of the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility64 are designed for the 
purpose of determining State responsibility and do not necessarily preclude 
the application of more liberal criteria with a view to determining the origin 
of a cyber attack. It is, however, unclear whether States are prepared to 
agree on such criteria. 
It is generally agreed that, in view of the architecture and characteristics 
of cyberspace, it is “virtually impossible to attribute a cyberattack during an 
attack. Although states can trace the cyberattack back to a computer server 
in another state, conclusively ascertaining the identity of the attacker re-
quires an intensive, time-consuming investigation with assistance from the 
state of origin.”65 The cyber attacks on Estonia (2007) and on Georgia 
(2008) prove the correctness of this finding. The U.S. Department of De-
fense (DoD) has also stressed that because the “often low cost of develop-
ing malicious code and the high number and variety of actors in cyberspace 
make the discovery and tracking of malicious cyber tools difficult” and be-
cause “[m]ost of the technology used in this context is inherently dual-use, 
and even software might be minimally repurposed for malicious action,” 
the “interconnected nature of cyberspace poses significant challenges for 
applying some of the legal frameworks developed for specific physical do-
mains.”66 
Despite the difficulty of verifying the location from which an attack 
was launched or of identifying the attacker, DoD has announced it would 
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“actively [seek] to limit the ability of such potential actors to exploit or at-
tack the United States anonymously.”67 It is, of course, almost common-
place to state that interagency and international cooperation, as well as in-
formation sharing, is a necessary prerequisite to achieve that goal. In view 
of the special characteristics of cyberspace, it may well be that international 
law provides an obligation to cooperate if States are prepared to take at-
tribution measures in cyberspace. It will be interesting to see whether 
DoD’s efforts to “assess the identity of the attacker via behavior-based al-
gorithms” and to “significantly improve its cyber forensics capabilities”68 
are successful and, what is equally important, whether other States will ac-
cept the results as sufficient evidence of the source of a cyber attack. 
 
E. Conclusions with Regard to Territorial Sovereignty 
 
Territorial sovereignty has proven to be an effective principle of interna-
tional law that can be applied to cyberspace without far-reaching modifica-
tions if cyberspace is understood as comprising components (cyber infra-
structure) located in a State’s territory or that are otherwise protected by 
the principle of territorial sovereignty. Of course, not all aspects of conduct 
constituting a violation of territorial sovereignty have been clarified. For 
instance, there is still no consensus among States as to which cyber opera-
tions qualify as a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter or as an armed attack under Article 51. Also, the rather abstract 
references to “critical infrastructure” as being protected by the principle of 
territorial sovereignty are not very helpful in the absence of a consensus as 
to which objects and governmental institutions are to be considered “criti-
cal” in nature.  
The concept of territorial jurisdiction also provides an effective basis 
for the regulation of cyber activities. States are entitled to regulate activities 
occurring within their territories and to enforce their domestic law. Alt-
hough States enjoy an almost unlimited right to exercise their jurisdiction 
over cyber activities and cyber infrastructure within their territory, there is 
an undisputable need for an internationally agreed understanding that the 
Internet’s functionality—the benefits it provides—would be seriously chal-
lenged if States do not exercise their jurisdiction “with respect for one an-
other’s networks and the broader Internet.”69  
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“Neutrality” denotes the legal status of a State that is not a party to an in-
ternational armed conflict. Since the rules of international law applicable to 
neutral States are predominantly laid down in 1907 Hague Conventions V70 
and XIII,71 one might assume that the law of neutrality has become obso-
lete by desuetude or because an impartial stance vis-à-vis the aggressor and 
the victim of aggression would be irreconcilable with the jus ad bellum as 
codified in the UN Charter.  
Indeed the international armed conflicts that have occurred since the 
end of the Second World War (e.g., the conflicts between Israel and Egypt, 
India and Pakistan, the United Kingdom and Argentina, and Iraq and Iran) 
might cast doubts on the continuing validity of the traditional law of neu-
trality. This does not establish, however, that there is no longer a law of 
neutrality. The very fact that some neutral governments have tried to con-
ceal their “unneutral service” is in itself evidence those governments con-
sidered themselves bound by the law of neutrality. And those governments 
that openly supported one side of an international armed conflict—in most 
instances because the aggrieved belligerent was unable to react to their 
non-compliance with neutral obligations—often went to great length to 
justify their conduct. 
States, although their conduct may not always have been in full compli-
ance with the principle of impartiality, have, however, recognized that the 
traditional law of neutrality continues to apply in situations of international 
armed conflict.72 The military manuals of the United States,73 Canada,74 the 
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United Kingdom75 and Germany,76 as well as the San Remo Manual,77 the 
International Law Association’s Helsinki Principles78 and the HPCR Manu-
al,79 all address the continued applicability of the law of neutrality to inter-
national armed conflicts. Thus, both State practice and writings establish 
the law of neutrality is alive and well.80 
Under the UN Charter it is, at least in theory, possible to distinguish 
between an aggressor and the victim of aggression. This does not mean 
that States are entitled to unilaterally absolve themselves from the obliga-
tions of the law of neutrality and take a “benevolent” attitude in favor of 
the alleged victim of an unlawful use of force.81 If, however, the UN Secu-
rity Council has decided upon preventive or enforcement measures under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the scope of applicability of the law of 
neutrality will be reduced considerably and the 1907 Hague Conventions 
will be inapplicable.82 Under Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter, States 
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not parties to an international armed conflict are obliged to comply with 
UN Security Council decisions and, in any event, to refrain from activities 
interfering with or impeding the exercise of enforcement operations au-
thorized by resolutions implementing those decisions.83 
In view of the foregoing, this section starts from the premise that, sub-
ject to decisions by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, the traditional law of neutrality applies to States not parties to an 
international armed conflict. It will first explore whether, and to what ex-
tent, that body of law is applicable to cyberspace. It will then identify the 
obligations of belligerents and of neutrals with regard to military operations 
in cyberspace. 
 
A. Applicability of the Law of Neutrality to Cyberspace 
 
The continuing validity of the core principles and rules of the law of neu-
trality in an international armed conflict characterized by the use of tradi-
tional kinetic weapons is beyond question. But when it comes to hostilities 
and hostile acts conducted in or through cyberspace, some might reject 
their applicability. Indeed, if cyberspace is considered to be a new “fifth 
dimension,” a “global common” that “defies measurement in any physical 
dimension or time space continuum,”84 it could be rather difficult to main-
tain that the law of neutrality applies. If it is acknowledged, however, that 
cyberspace “requires a physical architecture to exist,”85 many of the diffi-
culties can be overcome. 
The law of neutrality serves a dual protective purpose. On the one 
hand, it is to protect the territorial sovereignty of neutral States and their 
nationals against the harmful effects of the ongoing hostilities. On the oth-
er hand, it aims to protect belligerent interests against interference by neu-
tral States and their nationals to the benefit of one belligerent and to the 
detriment of the other. Thus, the rules and principles of the law of neutrali-
ty aim to prevent escalation of an ongoing international armed conflict 
“[by] regulating the conduct of belligerents with respect to nations not par-
ticipating in the conflict, [by] regulating the conduct of neutrals with re-
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spect to belligerents, and [by] reducing the harmful effects of such hostili-
ties on international commerce.”86 
Applied in the cyber context, it is safe to conclude that the law of neu-
trality protects the cyber infrastructure located in the territory of a neutral 
State or that resides in sovereign immune platforms and other objects used 
by the neutral State for non-commercial government purposes. Thus, bel-
ligerents are under an obligation to respect the sovereignty and inviolability 
of States not parties to the international armed conflict by refraining from 
any harmful interference with the cyber infrastructure located in neutral 
territory. Neutral States must remain impartial and may not engage in cyber 
activities that support the military actions of one belligerent to the detri-
ment of the opposing belligerent. Moreover, they are obliged to take all 
feasible measures to terminate an abuse of the cyber infrastructure located 
within their territory or on their sovereign immune platforms by the bellig-
erents. 
Because they are based upon a teleological interpretation of the law of 
neutrality, some may question these findings; however, they are supported 
not only by the majority of authors addressing the issue of neutrality in the 
cyber context,87 but also by State practice. For instance, DoD has taken the 
position that “long-standing international norms guiding state behavior—in 
times of peace and conflict—also apply in cyberspace.”88 DoD’s Cyber-
space Policy Report, inter alia, emphasizes that “applying the tenets of the 
law of armed conflict [is] critical.”89 The report also addresses activities 
“taking place on or through computers or other infrastructure located in a 
neutral third country.”90 The applicability of the law of neutrality to cyber-
space has also been acknowledged in the recent HPCR Manual.91 Since that 
manual has been endorsed by a considerable number of governments, it 
may be considered a restatement of the existing law, and as reflecting the 
consensus of those States on the issues it addresses. 
Of course, the rules of the traditional law of neutrality, while in princi-
ple applicable to cyberspace, may require clarification—or even modifica-
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tion—because of the unique characteristics of cyberspace.92 Still the “law of 
armed conflict and customary international law . . . provide a strong basis 
to apply such norms to cyberspace governing responsible state behavior.”93 
 
B. Obligations of Belligerents 
 
Under the law of neutrality belligerents are obliged to respect the inviolabil-
ity of neutral territory; hence, they are prohibited from conducting hostili-
ties, from exercising belligerent rights or establishing bases of operations 
within neutral territory. These prohibitions are laid down in international 
treaties94 and they are considered customary in character.95 
 
1. No Harmful Interference with Neutral Cyber Infrastructure 
 
It follows from the foregoing that cyber infrastructure located within the 
territory of a neutral State is protected against harmful interference by the 
belligerents. It does not matter whether the cyber infrastructure is owned 
or exclusively used by the government, corporations or private individuals. 
Neither does the protection depend upon the nationality of the owner. In 
view of the principle of sovereign immunity, the same protection applies to 
cyber infrastructure located on neutral State ships and State aircraft or in 
diplomatic premises.  
The prohibition on harmful interference with neutral cyber infrastruc-
ture is not limited to cyber attacks strictu sensu, i.e., to cyber operations that 
cause, or are expected to cause, damage, destruction, death or injury. Ra-
ther, it is to be understood as also comprising all activities, whether kinetic 
or cyber, that either have a negative impact on their functionality or make 
their use impossible. In other words, it is prohibited to engage in “the use 
of network-based capabilities . . . to disrupt, deny, degrade, manipulate, or 
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destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the 
computers and networks themselves”96 of a neutral State. 
Of course, as previously noted, mere intrusion into neutral cyber infra-
structure is not covered by this prohibition, because international law does 
not prohibit espionage. It must be borne in mind, however, that the princi-
ple of territorial sovereignty includes the prohibition on exercising jurisdic-
tion on foreign territory;97 therefore a cyber operation characterized as an 
exercise of jurisdiction would be in violation of the sovereignty of the tar-
get State. That prohibition is of a general character and thus not part of the 
law of neutrality strictu sensu.  
 
2. Exercise of Belligerent Rights and Use of Cyber Infrastructure in 
Neutral Territory 
 
Belligerents are prohibited from using neutral cyber infrastructure for the 
purpose of exercising belligerent rights against the enemy or against others. 
It is important to note that the term “belligerent rights” is not limited to 
cyber attacks, but refers to all measures a belligerent is entitled to take un-
der the law of armed conflict against the enemy belligerent, enemy nation-
als or the nationals of neutral States.98 This prohibition follows from the 
very object and purpose of the law of neutrality, i.e., to prevent an escala-
tion of the international armed conflict. 
In view of its object and purpose, this prohibition also applies to the 
exercise of belligerent rights through the use of neutral cyber infrastructure 
that enjoys sovereign immunity, that is, infrastructure located outside neu-
tral territory used by a neutral State for exclusively non-commercial gov-
ernment purposes. It is not as certain that the prohibition also applies to 
the use of cyber infrastructure owned by a private corporation or an indi-
vidual located outside neutral territory. In such a situation, however, the 
cyber infrastructure can be considered as contributing to the enemy’s mili-
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tary action and the opposing belligerent would be entitled to treat it as a 
lawful military objective.99 
Moreover, a belligerent may not make use of its own cyber infrastruc-
ture for military purposes if it is located on neutral territory. It is irrelevant 
whether the cyber infrastructure has been “erected” prior to or after the 
outbreak of the international armed conflict. This prohibition follows from 
Article 3 of Hague V, according to which 
 
belligerents are . . . forbidden to: 
 
(a) Erect on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless telegraphy 
station or other apparatus for the purpose of communicating 
with belligerent forces on land or sea; 
 
(b) Use any installation of this kind established by them before the 
war on the territory of a neutral Power for purely military pur-
poses, and which has not been opened for the purpose of public 
messages. 
 
3. Exceptions to the Prohibition on Exercising Belligerent Rights 
 
As has been discussed, the prohibition on exercising belligerent rights 
through the use of neutral cyber infrastructure must be interpreted in the 
light of the unique characteristics of cyberspace.100 Cyberspace is an “inter-
dependent network of information technology infrastructures, including 
the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and em-
bedded processors and controllers.”101 Given the interdependence and 
ubiquity of cyberspace and its components, it would be almost impossible 
for a belligerent to prevent the routing of malicious data packages through 
the cyber infrastructure located in the territory of a neutral State even 
though it is ultimately aimed against the enemy. Therefore, it seems to be 
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101. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, supra note 5. See also the definition 
by Schaap, supra note 5, at 126 (“cyberspace” is a “domain characterized by the use of 
[computers and other electronic devices] to store, modify, and exchange data via net-












logical and perhaps even cogent to apply Article 8 of Hague V to cyber op-
erations and cyber attacks conducted by a belligerent against its enemy. Ar-
ticle 8 provides: “A neutral Power is not called upon to forbid or restrict 
the use on behalf of the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or of 
wireless telegraphy apparatus belonging to it or to companies or private 
individuals.” 
Doubts have been articulated in the literature as to whether Article 8 
has any application to cyberspace.102 That position is based on the assump-
tion that a cyber operation conducted through neutral cyber infrastructure 
is to be considered as originating from neutral territory. Article 8, however, 
only applies to communications. It is Article 2 of Hague V that prohibits 
belligerents, inter alia, from moving “munitions of war or supplies across 
the territory of a neutral Power.” If the distinction between mere commu-
nications through and passage of “munitions of war . . . across” were ap-
plied to cyberspace, any transmission of a cyber weapon through neutral 
cyber infrastructure would constitute a violation of the law of neutrality, 
whereas mere communications would not. Indeed, there are some indica-
tions that States share that view. For instance, in 1999 DoD’s Office of 
General Counsel arrived at the conclusion that “[t]here is nothing in this 
agreement [i.e., Hague V] that would suggest that it applies to systems that 
generate information, rather than merely relay communications.”103 It is 
interesting to note that DoD seems prepared to apply Article 8 to cyber-
space, although it would limit its applicability to mere communications, i.e., 
to cyber operations that do not amount to a cyber attack. 
Articles 2 and 8 of Hague V are based on the assumption that a neutral 
State exercises full and effective control over its entire territory, but not 
over installations and objects used for communications purposes. The dif-
ferent degrees of feasible and effective control must also be taken into ac-
count in the cyber context. In recognition of the nature of cyberspace, the 
HPCR Manual provides: “[W]hen Belligerent Parties use for military pur-
poses a public, internationally and openly accessible network such as the 
Internet, the fact that part of this infrastructure is situated within the juris-
diction of a Neutral does not constitute a violation of neutrality.”104 
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103. Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, An Assessment of In-
ternational Legal Issues in Information Operations 10 (May 1999), available at 
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The HPCR Manual does not distinguish between mere communications 
on the one hand and the transmission of cyber weapons on the other. The 
phrase “use for military purposes” is sufficiently broad to cover both. This 
seems to be a reasonable adaptation of the traditional rules of the law of 
neutrality to cyberspace. Because of the complexity and interdependence of 
contemporary networks, such as the Internet, it is impossible to exercise 
the control necessary to effectively interfere with communications over 
such networks. This is underlined by the fact that most such communica-
tions are often neither traceable nor predictable since they will be transmit-
ted over lines of communications and routers passing through various 
countries before reaching their ultimate destinations. These realities being 
taken into account, under this view, the mere fact that military communica-
tions, including cyber attacks, have been transmitted via the cyber infra-
structure of a neutral State is not considered to constitute a violation of 
that State’s neutral obligations. 
It is acknowledged, despite the attractiveness of the HPCR Manual’s 
approach for both belligerents and neutral States, it is unclear that such a 
far-reaching adaptation of Article 8 to cyber operations conducted for mili-
tary purposes will ultimately be accepted as reflective of contemporary cus-
tomary international law. Modern State practice, especially the cyber opera-
tions during the 1999 Kosovo campaign, the conflicts in Afghanistan 
(2001) and Iraq (2003), and the armed conflict between Georgia and Russia 
(2007), provides insufficient evidence to establish that a cyber operation, 
including the transmission of cyber weapons through neutral cyber infra-
structure, does not violate the neutrality of the States through which the 
transmissions passed. First, there is no open-source information establish-
ing that the cyber operations amounted to cyber attacks or that they had 
been routed through neutral cyber infrastructure. Second, the distributed 
denial-of-serve attacks against Georgia, according to the position taken by 
this author, do not qualify as cyber attacks strictu sensu and, therefore, can-
not be assimilated to the transit of “munitions of war” under Article 2 of 
Hague V. On the other hand, the DoD’s Cyberspace Policy Report sug-
gests the United States considers every “malicious cyber activity” as a viola-
tion of the law of neutrality, irrespective of whether they have been 
launched from or merely transmitted through “computers or other infra-
structure located in a neutral third country.”105 
                                                                                                                      












What is clear today is that the use of neutral cyber communications by 
a belligerent does not constitute a violation of neutrality even though it 
serves military purposes. It is less clear, however, that this is also true if the 
cyber operation qualifies as a “malicious cyber activity” or cyber attack. We 
will return to this issue in the context of the consequences of a violation of 
the law of neutrality by neutral States. 
 
C. Obligations of Neutral States 
 
The law of neutrality, in view of its object and purpose,106 poses obligations 
not only upon the belligerents, but also on neutral States. Setting aside the 
duty of impartiality,107 a neutral State’s obligations may be divided into 
three categories: (1) a prohibition on allowing or tolerating the exercise of 
belligerent rights in its territory, (2) an obligation to terminate (and proba-
bly to prevent) a violation of its neutrality by a belligerent and (3) an obliga-
tion to accept the enforcement of the law of neutrality by the aggrieved 
belligerent. 
 
1. The Prohibition on Allowing or Tolerating the Exercise of  
Belligerent Rights 
 
According to Article 5 of Hague V, a “neutral Power must not allow any of 
the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 to occur in its territory.” Accordingly, 
a neutral State may not allow or tolerate the exercise of belligerent rights 
that utilize either the cyber infrastructure located within its territory or that 
located outside its territory, provided that the neutral State exercises exclu-
sive control over it.108 
The different interpretations of Article 8 of Hague V may have far-
reaching consequences. Under the HPCR Manual approach,109 a malicious 
cyber activity routed through neutral cyber infrastructure that is, for exam-
ple, a component of the Internet would not constitute a prohibited exercise 
                                                                                                                      
106. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
107. Hague V, supra note 70, art. 9. Article 9 of Hague XIII provides a “neutral Power 
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made by it.” Accordingly, restrictions on military communications via its cyber infrastruc-
ture must be applied impartially by the neutral State. See also SAN REMO MANUAL, supra 
note 77, ¶ 19. 
108. See supra notes 98–105 and accompanying text. 













of belligerent rights. Therefore, a neutral State allowing or tolerating such 
an activity would not violate its obligations under the law of neutrality. If, 
however, the HPCR Manual approach is not considered to reflect custom-
ary international law, the transmission of a cyber attack through neutral 
infrastructure would have to be considered a prohibited exercise of bellig-
erent rights, and the neutral State that knowingly allows or tolerates the 
transmission would be in violation of its neutral obligations. 
But even if the latter approach is taken, the consequences are less grave 
than one may assume. Contrary to the position of one author,110 the use of 
the term “allow” in the traditional rule presupposes knowledge by the neu-
tral State. That will be the case if it has detected a malicious cyber activi-
ty/cyber attack or if it has been informed in a sufficiently credible manner 
that the activity/attack has originated from, or has been transmitted 
through, the State’s cyber infrastructure. Such knowledge will result in a 
violation of the law of neutrality by the neutral State only if the malicious 
cyber activity continues. In most cases, cyber attacks will occur at such high 
speed that the knowledge that it has occurred is available only after the 
event. Ex post facto knowledge hardly suffices to justify a claim of a viola-
tion of the law of neutrality.  
Even if constructive—as opposed to actual—knowledge is considered 
sufficient to establish a violation of the obligation that too would not result 
in noticeable changes in the manner in which the law of neutrality applies. 
Constructive knowledge means that the neutral State should have known 
of the malicious activity, but, again, in most cases such knowledge would 
not necessarily result in a violation of neutral obligations, because of the 
speed of cyber operations. 
The analysis would probably be different if, as a result of the prohibi-
tion of allowing the exercise of belligerent rights, neutral States were 
obliged to actively monitor cyber activities originating from or transiting 
through their cyber infrastructure; however, it is far from settled that such 
an obligation exists. The San Remo Manual, in addressing physical violations 
of neutral territory, provides that a “neutral State must take such measures . 
. . including the exercise of surveillance, as the means at its disposal allow, 
to prevent the violation of its neutrality by belligerent forces.”111 It is not 
likely, however, that States, especially those that defend the freedom of In-
ternet communications, will agree that the obligation to monitor land areas 
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and certain sea areas applies equally to the cyber infrastructure located in 
their territory. 
 
2. Obligation to Terminate and to Prevent a Violation of Neutrality 
 
According to the traditional law of neutrality, neutral States are obliged to 
terminate an exercise of belligerent rights and any other violation of their 
neutrality by one of the belligerents.112 This obligation is part of contempo-
rary customary international law.113 
The obligation to enforce neutral status against violations by the bellig-
erents is not absolute in character, but is limited to what is feasible. In oth-
er words, the neutral State is obliged to use all means reasonably available 
to it to terminate an exercise of belligerent rights occurring within its terri-
tory.114 The applicable standard is not objective but rather subjective; it de-
pends on the means and capabilities factually available to the neutral State. 
It must be emphasized that, subject to feasibility, the duty to enforce neu-
tral status entails an obligation to use all means necessary, including the use 
of force, to effectively terminate an unlawful exercise of belligerent rights. 
The belligerent against which such measures are applied may not consider 
them as a hostile act, that is, it is obliged to tolerate them as a lawful action 
by the neutral State carrying out its neutrality obligations.115 
The obligation to terminate an ongoing violation of neutrality presup-
poses knowledge—actual or constructive—by the neutral State.116 It is 
quite probable that the neutral State is unaware of an abuse of its cyber in-
frastructure. But even if such actual or constructive knowledge existed, it 
would in most cases be futile to demand the neutral State take measures 
against the belligerent, because the cyber operation triggering the duty to 
terminate has been completed. 
                                                                                                                      
112. Id., ¶¶ 18, 22; HPCR MANUAL, supra note 26, rule 168(a). See also 1923 Hague 
Rules, supra note 95, arts. 42, 47. 
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Limiting a neutral’s obligation to the termination of ongoing cyber ac-
tivities is considered by some authors to be insufficient. They assert that a 
neutral State is also obliged to take all feasible measures to prevent an exer-
cise of belligerent rights, that is, to act before it occurs.117 At first glance, 
that position seems to reflect customary international law, because some 
military manuals expressly refer not only to an obligation to terminate an 
ongoing violation of neutrality, but also to a duty to prevent an exercise of 
belligerent rights within neutral territory.118 It is, however, doubtful wheth-
er the use of the term “prevent” is meant to establish an obligation vis-à-
vis future violations of neutrality. But even if that were the case, the duty to 
prevent would be limited to violations of neutral territory and national air-
space. It is far from clear that States are willing to accept a prevention re-
quirement, because that implies an obligation to continuously monitor 
cyber activities originating from or transiting through their cyber infrastruc-
ture. Additionally, monitoring would be of limited utility since, as has been 
shown, the identification of the malicious nature of data packages transiting 
through a network would in most cases be extremely difficult, if not im-
possible. 
Therefore, there are good reasons for rejecting a prospective duty of 
prevention. If there is such an obligation, it exists only with regard to activ-
ities within neutral territory that could be assimilated to those covered by 
Article 8 of Hague XIII.119 For instance, the authorities of a neutral State 
may have actual or constructive knowledge of the activities of a group of 
hackers that has been employed by a belligerent government to develop a 
cyber weapon to be used against the enemy. In such a situation the neutral 
State would be obliged to take all feasible measure to prevent the departure 




                                                                                                                      
117. Kastenberg, supra note 12, at 56–64. 
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3. Consequences of Non-compliance by Neutral States 
 
The law of neutrality provides that if a neutral State fails to terminate an 
exercise of belligerent rights or other violations of its neutrality by one bel-
ligerent, the other belligerent is entitled to take those measures necessary to 
terminate the violation.120 The right of the aggrieved belligerent to enforce 
the law of neutrality comes into operation if the neutral State is either un-
willing or unable to comply with its obligation to terminate a violation of 
its neutral status by the enemy. This right is a specific form of a counter-
measure, i.e., a measure that would be unlawful if it was not taken in re-
sponse to a violation of international obligations by the target State.121 Its 
object and purpose are (1) to induce the neutral State to comply with its 
obligations and (2) to enable the aggrieved belligerent to preserve its securi-
ty interests. Not every violation of neutrality by one belligerent justifies a 
resort to countermeasures by the other belligerent. The violation in ques-
tion must have a negative impact on the legitimate security interests of that 
belligerent. This will not be the case if a belligerent takes measures against a 
neutral State’s cyber infrastructure that do not provide a military advantage 
vis-à-vis the other belligerent. In that case, the right to respond to the vio-
lation is reserved to the neutral State and the exercise of that right is prob-
ably subject to a de minimis exception. 
When the neutral State does not act to terminate a violation of its neu-
trality, the aggrieved belligerent is not entitled to immediately resort to the 
exercise of countermeasures. In that regard, the San Remo Manual provides: 
“If the neutral State fails to terminate the violation of its neutral waters by a 
belligerent, the opposing belligerent must so notify the neutral State and 
give that neutral State a reasonable time to terminate the violation by the 
belligerent.”122 An immediate response by the aggrieved belligerent is lawful 
only if (1) the violation constitutes a serious and immediate threat to the 
security of that belligerent, (2) there is no feasible and timely alternative 
and (3) the enforcement measure taken is necessary to respond to the 
threat posed by the violation.123 
                                                                                                                      
120. Commander’s Handbook, supra note 73, ¶ 7.3; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 
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The aggrieved belligerent’s right to enforce the law of neutrality certain-
ly applies to cyberspace if a malicious cyber activity originates from the ter-
ritory of a neutral State.124 DoD seems to be prepared to take such en-
forcement measures if it is determined a neutral State is aware of the mali-
cious cyber activity.  The Cyberspace Policy Report indicates that in mak-
ing that determination the following will be taken into account:  
 
The nature of the malicious cyber activity; the role, if any, of the third 
country; the ability and willingness of the third country to respond effec-
tively to the malicious cyber activity; and the appropriate course of action 
for the U.S. Government to address potential issues of third-party sover-
eignty depending upon the particular circumstances.125 
 
This is a clear restatement of the rules of the law of neutrality, providing 
evidence of DoD’s willingness to apply those rules to conduct in cyber-
space.  
 
D. Conclusions with Regard to the Law of Neutrality  
 
It has been shown that the traditional law of neutrality is, in principle, ap-
plicable to cyberspace. This is especially true of belligerent cyber operations 
that qualify as an exercise of belligerent rights within neutral territory. As 
with the principle of territorial sovereignty, the special characteristics of 
cyberspace do not, as such, pose an obstacle to the application of that law. 
Certainly, however, there remains an urgent need for clarification and even 
adaptation of the traditional law. In view of the interdependence of the 
networks through which data are transmitted and the potentially disastrous 
effects on critical infrastructure subjected to a cyber attack, there is a high 
probability that belligerent States will take measures, including the use of 
kinetic force, against neutral States and their cyber infrastructure if they 
determine vital security interests are at stake. Such measures have the po-
tential to jeopardize the essential object and purpose of the law of neutrali-





                                                                                                                      













IV. FINAL THOUGHTS 
 
The U.S. government has taken helpful first steps in the identification of 
the applicable rules of international law and their interpretation in the con-
text of the challenges brought about by the specific characteristics of cy-
berspace. Other governments should closely cooperate in a continuing ef-
fort to arrive at an operable consensus that takes into consideration global 
interoperability, network stability, reliable access and cybersecurity due dili-
gence.126 The five criteria identified in the International Strategy for Cyber-
space should be accepted by other States because they are of a potentially 
norm-creating character and assist in clarifying the scope of existing rules 
and principles of international law applicable to the cyber domain. Moreo-
ver, governments should cooperate with a view to improving their capabili-
ties in the area of cyber forensics. Such cooperative efforts are necessary 
not only in order to identify attackers, but also to establish a more effective 
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